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JUDICIAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
By CARL E. B. MCKENRY, JR.t
I. INTRODUCTION
There is, perhaps, no subject in reference to which it is more difficult to lay
down precise rules by which every case can be clearly and certainly de-
termined than the subject of the jurisdiction of courts. It is a subject, too,
about which much has been loosely said. Only occasionally, have superior
minds closely considered the principles involved and undertaken to define,
with care, the boundaries of the jurisdiction of courts and the circum-
stances under which their jurisdiction will and will not attach.'
I F THE foregoing applies to general problems of judicial jurisdiction,
it has even greater applicability to those international aviation cases
subject to the terms and conditions of the Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
which in commom usage is known as the Warsaw Convention of 1929.
As one federal jurist recently put it: "Much of the case law on the
subject is confused and not well-reasoned. As so frequently happens, the
term 'jurisdiction' has been loosely used in many cases and there appears
to be no consistent or logical pattern of decisional law."'
Another federal judge conceded in a Warsaw case: "The question of
jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is not free from
doubt..."'
With an ever increasing number of international flights which transit
United States territory, involve U.S. carriers or citizens, and/or have
the contract of carriage made in the United States, the topic considered
herein may soon be transformed from a highly specialized and perhaps
academic area to one of practical application and use to more and more
general practitioners. Under such circumstances it would appear desirable
to alleviate as many "doubts" and "confusions" as possible in regard to
judicial jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention.
II. WARSAW CONVENTION APPLICABILITY
Before judicial jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
can be ascertained, applicability under Article 1 must first be considered.
This is necessary in every case, since Article 28 may have an absolute con-
t A.B., LL.B., LL.M.; Director, Program of Continuing Legal Education, University of Miami
Law Center; Assistant Professor of Transportation Management and Business Law, University of
Miami; Engineering Department of Pan American World Airways 1948-1954; Pan American
Legal Department 1954-1957.
1 14 Am. Jur., Courts § 159 (1938) at p. 362.
'Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
'Winsor, Admr. v. United Airlines, Inc., 1M3 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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trol over the jurisdiction of a court within the United States,' and may
well have the unique effect of preventing jurisdiction of the court rather
than invoking it in spite of every other accepted jurisdictional contact
or standard being to the contrary. s
United States cases involving the question of Convention applicability
can be divided into two major classes:
1. Those situations coming under Article 1, wherein the basic question
is whether or not the Convention has any applicability whatsoever! If
a contract of carriage does not bring the flight during which the accident
occurred under the Warsaw Convention, the jurisdictional elements of
the Convention are without effect.
2. Those cases wherein the Convention does apply but a particular set
of facts is presented which without destroying its over-all applicability
renders specific portions of the Convention unenforceable. The situations
coming under this second class are generally of two types:
(a) Those wherein the carrier has failed to deliver a properly executed
passenger ticket (Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 3 of the Convention),
baggage check (Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 4) or airway bill (Article
9), thereby removing the effect of Article 22 which normally limits the
amount which can be recovered by a claimant from the responsible
carrier."
(b) A second situation also involves the removal of the protective limits
of liability under Article 22, however, from another direction. In this
area, a set of facts which show the carrier has been guilty of willful mis-
conduct will serve to void the effect of Article 22.8 However, neither of
these two latter situations have any direct effect upon judicial jurisdiction
under Article 28, which remains in force.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL PROVISION: ARTICLE 28
The question of Convention applicability has been considered recog-
nizing that the question of jurisdiction does not become relevant and
cannot be determined until the forum has found that the Warsaw Con-
vention rules apply to the contract of carriage in question. Until such
a determination is made, the courts would, no doubt, proceed under their
own appropriate and applicable rules as to substance and jurisdiction as
well as procedure. The application of the Warsaw Convention rules in
4 E.g., Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian International Airlines, 29 Misc.2d 449, 211 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Gordon v. Sabena Air Lines, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cry., April 25, 1962.
'The most extreme situation being a case wherein the forum at the locus delicti is deprived
of jurisdiction even though its own citizens may be involved.
'E.g., Grein v. Imperial Airways (1937) 1 K.B. 50; Wyman v. Pan American Airways, 181
Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943); 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1944);
293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1944). Glenn v. Compania Cu-
bana de Aviacion, 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952); Garcia v. Pan American Airways, 269 App.
Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945) as affirmed in effect on certified questions 295 N.Y. 850, 67
N.E.2d 257 (1946); cert. denied, 282 U.S. 1 (1946).
7E.g., Grey v. American Airlines 227 F.2d 282 (2nd Cir. 1955); Preston v. Hunting Air
Transport (1956), 1 Q.B. 454; Ross v. Pan American Air-Ways, 190 Misc. 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d 257
(Sup. Ct. 1947); affirmed 274 App. Div. 769, 80 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1948).
' E.g., American Airlines v. Ulen, 174 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Goepp v. American Overseas
Airlines, 281 App. Div. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952); Pekelis v. Trans World Airlines, 187
F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1951). cert denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); Horabin v. B.O.A.C. 2 All E.R.
1016. (Q.B. 1952).
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all probability, would have to be raised affirmatively by the defendant'
in order to gain recognition and become operative although it would be
quite proper, correct and desirable for the alert jurist to take judicial
notice of the Warsaw Convention as a treaty obligation of the United
States and enforce its rules even in the absence of specific pleading in this
regard by either of the parties to the action.
A. Text
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention deals specifically with the ques-
tion of judicial jurisdiction. The text of this Article is quoted below in
the three versions which are of consequence to this study:
1) L'action en responsabilit6 devra etre port~e, au choix du demandeur, dans
le territoire d'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, soit devant le tribunal
du domicile du transporteur, du siege principal de son exploitation ou du
lieu ou il posskde un 6stablissement par le soin duquel le contrat a 6t6
conclu, soit devant le tribunal du lieu de destination.
2) La procedure sera r~gl~e par la loi du tribunal saisi.le (Official French text)
1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
Court having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has his
principal place of business, or has an establishment by which the contract
has been made or before the court having jurisdiction at the place of desti-
nation.
2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the Court seised
of the case.' (Official British text)
1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
Court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business,
through which the contract has been made, or before the Court at the place
of destination.
2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the Court to
which the case is submitted." (Translation by U.S. Department of State)
The French version is the official text of the Convention and the version
officially accepted by the Senate of the United States. The translation pro-
vided by the United States Department of State, while not officially ac-
cepted, accompanied the original French at the time of acceptance by the
United States Senate, and has been used in a quasi-official manner in all
considerations of the Warsaw Convention before United States Courts."5
The British version is the official text as accepted by the British Parliament
rather than the original French."4
'Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) at 507:
The claim of the plaintiff here against the defendant carrier is not based on The
Warsaw Convention but on the tort arising from the defendant carrier's alleged
negligence. This court, having in personam jurisdiction over the parties, has jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(1) by reason
of alleged diversity of citizenship coupled with jurisdictional amount. The com-
plaint does not refer to the Warsaw Convention, nor are any such allegations re-
quired. It is quite sufficient to make out a claim as it stands.
'049 Stat. 3007.
'Carriage by Air Act (1932), 22 and 23 Geo. 5, c. 36. First Schedule, Article 28.
1"49 Stat. 3020.
"
5 American Airlines v. Ulen, 174 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
1 Carriage by Air Act (1932), 22 and 23 Geo. 5, c. 36.
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Certain differences between the British and the United States transla-
tions are readily apparent, the impact of which will be considered at the
propitious place.
B. Specific Jurisdictions Under Article 28
The main intent of this Article is to set forth the courts which are
competent forums for actions under the Warsaw Convention. Four specific
jurisdictional contacts are provided, three relating to the carrier, and the
last based on place of destination. Each of these contacts is deserving of
specific and individual consideration.
1. Contact One--YCourt of the Domicile of the Carrier"
The United States translation of the original French text of the Con-
vention reading, "court of the domicile of the carrier," is probably more
literal than the British text which provides, "court having jurisdiction
where the carrier is ordinarily resident."
While perhaps more accurate, the use of the term "domicile" in coun-
tries such as the United States creates a question as to whether the domicile
referred to in this Article extends to the whole territory of the contracting
country, or means the component state in which the carrier has its resi-
dence if an individual, or is incorporated, if a corporation."
Goedhuis states that this difficulty could be solved if the American
translation used the same wording that was used in the British transla-
tion. " It is not apparent how the use of the British text would simplify
matters.
Even if we were to use the British translation, the same question of
applicability to the uniform territorial sovereignty vis-a-vis the com-
ponent state is present with regard to the other three jurisdictional con-
tacts as well. For example, if the place of destination is New York City,
New York, would the state courts of Massachusetts be able to hear the
case in the absence of one of the other three contacts being in that state?
On the other hand, if the federal courts were chosen, would the United
States District Court in some district outside of New York have jurisdic-
tion of the case, assuming that other contacts were lacking? These are
questions which though jurisdictional in nature are more closely related
to venue when considered on the level of international agreement and
will be treated at a later point in this study.
The British translation itself is not invulnerable to criticism. Based on
that version, contact one, "where ordinarily resident," and contact two
tprincipal place of business" are at best difficult to distinguish in practice.
On the other hand, the difference between "domicile" and "principal place
of business" is readily apparent in theory and in practice.
For example, an air carrier might incorporate in country X for tax
and/or other purposes, but maintain its executive offices and conduct its
principal business activities from country Y. Conceivably all of the cor-
porate officers and directors could be in Y with only a designated agent
for legal purposes in X. Under this situation could X be considered the
place where the carrier is ordinarily resident? Certainly a serious factual
"Sullivan, Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 J. Air L. &
Corn. 47 (1936).
"6 Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention (1937), at p. 293.
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question is raised. On the other hand X is without question the place of
domicile of the carrier corporation regardless of other contacts which
might be available.
Earlier drafts of what eventually became Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention did not make any provision for either "domicile" or "place
where ordinarily resident." The only contact in this regard was "le si~ge
principal de son exploitation," which the United States State Department
originally translated to mean, "a registered office of the concern." 7 How-
ever, at the Warsaw conference, the delegation of Czechoslovakia pro-
posed to add to the list of courts suggested the court of the domicile of
the carrier.
The Czech proposal was accepted, creating a problem as to the United
States translation of what is now officially the second contact under the
final form of the convention. Thereafter, the second contact was trans-
lated as "principal place of business.""
Regardless of the impact of the British translation before the courts
of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth Nations, it would appear
safe to assume before any of the United States courts that the place of
incorporation of a carrier corporation has jurisdiction, under contact
number one, "the carrier's place of domicile."'"
2. Contact Two--!Carrier's Principal Place of Business"
The British and the United States translations are identical as to this
contact. As previously considered, the original United States translation
was apparently modified after the carrier's "domicile" was added as
contact one in the final text of the Convention and this contact now
under study became contact two.
Actually, the translation of "le si6ge principal de son exploitation" to
mean "principal place of business" as reflected in the approved text is more
accurate than the earlier draft of "registered office of the concern."
In United States courts the principal place of business will normally
be construed as the jurisdiction in which the executive and main admin-
istrative functions of the carrier are located, or as stated in one federal case:
the nerve center from which it radiates out to its constituent parts and
from which its officers direct, control and co-ordinate all activities without
regard to locale, in the furtherance of the corporate objective."
It is clear as previously stated that "principal place of business" is not
synonymous with nor a test for "residence" or "domicile" either for a
corporation or as to a natural person." Therefore, those authorities sug-gesting that contact one and contact two are identical in actual operation
'7 Cha, Air Carriers' Liability to Passengers in International Law, 7 Air L. Rev. 60 (1936).
Is bid.
'9 However, note Winsor, Admr. v. United Airlines, Inc., Delaware Superior Court, New
Castle County, Sept. 12, 1958, 5 Av. Cas. 18,170 wherein the defendant carrier was incorporated
in the State of Delaware, but the accident took place in Colorado. Although transportation
covered by the Warsaw Convention rules was involved, the Court dismissed the action concluding
-- "that the doctrine of forun non conveniens should be applied in this case and that this Court
is free in its discretion to apply such doctrine."
"Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), Hughes
v. United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 895, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), also see In re
Hudson River Nay. Co., 59 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1932).
"Guinn v. Iowa Central Ry. Co., 14 Fed. 323, 324 (C.C. S.D. Iowa 1882).
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may not be giving the United States point of view appropriate con-
sideration.
Unlike the comparatively simple establishment of domicile under con-
tact one as the jurisdiction wherein the carrier is incorporated, contact
two, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, may require
the presentation of convincing evidence that the carrier actually has its
principal place of business within the jurisdiction of the forum. In this
regard it is conceivable that an international carrier with two or more
operating divisions or with a separation of its various executive functions
into two or more geographic locations would require extensive hearings
and submission of evidence to determine the jurisdiction of the forum
before even considering the merits of the case itself.
The most serious, albeit remote and extreme, possibility is that under
the situation set forth above several forums might hold simultaneously
that the carrier's principal place of business is located within their juris-
diction and as a result assume jurisdiction in more than the original four
contacts contemplated in Article 28 of the Convention.
A United States District Court saw fit to treat this provision as re-
quiring "a principal place of business" rather than "the principal place
of business."2 The result of opening such a "Pandora's Box" was illus-
trated in a later case" wherein the plaintiff cited the first case as support
for jurisdiction with the only local contact being a sales office which the
plaintiff urged constituted a principal place of business. The court in the
second case stopped such thinking with the statement: "Under this lan-
guage [Article 28], there can be only principal plan of business."24
As a practical matter there can be only one principal place of business
under this provision and there is little room for doubt but that the
framers of the Convention so intended.
3. Contact Three-"Where Carrier Has a Place of Business Through
Which the Contract Has Been Made"
It should be noted that there is a variance under this contact between
the British and the United States translations from the French. The
British use the word "establishment" while the United States translation
uses the words "place of business." The exact effect of this difference,
if any, has never been specifically determined.
If the carrier has an office of its own through which the ticket or air way-
bill is issued, then the forum having jurisdiction over the place where said
office is located clearly qualifies under contact three as a forum having
jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention. So far, no difficulty is pre-
sented, but what if the office is staffed by personnel supplied by another
airline? Or what if the ticket is sold by another carrier through an inter-
agency agreement? As a third possibility, what if the ticket is sold through
an independent travel agency authorized to maintain the carrier's ticket
stock and issue such contracts of carriage on behalf of the carrier? At
22Winsor, Admr. v. United Airlines, 153 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), wherein the court
apparently concluded that United Airlines could have a principal place of business in both New
York and Chicago for purposes of the Warsaw Convention. See also, Wood v. United Airlines, 216
F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) citing Clothier v. United Airlines, 196 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y.
1961).
2 3 Nudo v. Sabena Air Lines, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962).24 id. at 192.
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what point does the term "establishment" or "place of business" cease? To
what extent the framers of the Convention intended the agency relation-
ship to apply is not clear from the available minutes of the conference.
While Goedhuis in his pioneering volume on the Warsaw Convention"'
does not specifically consider the extent to which the agency relationship
should apply under this contact, he does shed some light on the matter
by way of comment on the British text of the convention:
It should, however, be pointed out that the difficulties which lead the court
having jurisdiction at the place of the accident to be omitted, also prevail
with regard to the competence of the court having jurisdiction at the place
where the carrier "has an establishment by which the contract has been
made."
It must be admitted that the word "establishment" ("place of business"
in U.S. translation) also includes agencies of the carrier, for the latter ex-
pression was used originally and was replaced by the word "establishment"
in order to include the branch offices of the carrier.
The several situations which may result from this question can best
be illustrated by example:
First, as to the issuance of the ticket or air waybill through another
carrier which handles the first part of the carriage. The passenger embarks
on a journey involving the services of several successive carriers in going
from origin to destination. He purchases his ticket from the first of these
carriers (carrier No. 1). If the injury occurs while on an aircraft belong-
ing to carrier No. 1 there is no question as to the third jurisdictional con-
tact under Article 28. However, if the mishap takes place while being
transported by carrier No. 2, or carrier No. 3, etc., jurisdiction becomes
more complex since Article 30 (2) of the Convention limits the passenger's
right of action to "the carrier who performed the transportation during
which the accident or delay occurred.' 7
Second, as to the issuance of a ticket or air waybill through another
carrier not involved in the transportation. The passenger purchases a
ticket through a carrier issuing the ticket on behalf of another carrier
which is usually, but not always, a subsidiary or affiliate of the first carrier
and does not maintain its own offices at that particular location.
Third, as to the issuance of a ticket through a travel agent. The pas-
senger purchases the ticket through a local travel agent who is authorized
(and usually through IATA, International Air Transport Association)
to issue tickets for the carrier.
As to the three situations outlined above there are several possibilities.
One is to simply ignore the question of any agency relationship between
the carrier liable and carrier number one or the travel agent, as the case
may be, thereby eliminating the application of contact three." Another
is to establish a legal presumption of agency between carrier number one
as Goedhuis, op. cit. supra note 16, at 287.
26 Ibid.
'€Warsaw Convention, Article 30. See also Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines, 257 F.2d 384 (2nd
Cir. 1958); cert. denied 358 U.S. 909 (1958).
'" Rotterdamsche Bank N.V. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 11 4 (Q.B.
1953).
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or the travel agent and all succeeding carriers so as to assure the jurisdiction
of the court at the place where the contract was made in all situations."
The third is to consider the factual situation in each individual case
and determine the existence or nonexistence of an agency relationship in
each instance based upon generally established principles of law for the
determination of such legal relationship. Finally, to hold that the intent
and meaning of the Convention in this regard is to require the carrier to
have an establishment of its own at the location where the contract was
made.
There have been two leading cases considering contact three, one before
the United States courts and the other in the British courts. In point of
time, Rotterdamsche Bank, N.V. v. British Overseas Airways Corp. was
the first case to consider the problem,"° because in previous Warsaw cases
both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the test of jurisdic-
tion under Article 28 was neither relevant nor required since the courts
involved were of competent jurisdiction whether the Warsaw Convention
and Article 28 applied or not. However, Rotterdamsche Bank presented a
slightly different situation. On March 22, 1950, the plaintiff had delivered
a shipment of gold coins to KLM in the Netherlands for delivery to
Banque de L'Indochina at Djibouti, French Somaliland. The contract of
carriage for the entire trip was based on an agreement between the banks
and BOAC in London. KLM, the first carrier, took the freight from
Rotterdam to Cairo where it was turned over to Aden Airways, a BOAC
subsidiary, for the remaining portion of the journey. Aden Airways car-
ried it to Asmara where it was to be transshipped to another Aden Air-
ways aircraft headed for Djibouti. Instead of going to its intended designa-
tion, the shipment was sent to Aden whereupon it vanished.
Suit was brought in London by the bank against BOAC and Aden
Airways. The principal issue centered around Warsaw Convention ap-
plicability. After it was determined that the Warsaw Convention was
applicable to the flight, the jurisdictional problem immediately came to
the foreground. The contract of carriage being with BOAC and entered
into at London along with other obvious jurisdictional contacts, such as
England being the principal place of business, as well as the domicile of
BOAC, left no doubt as to the court's jurisdiction. However, the court
held that it lacked jurisdiction over the second defendant, Aden Airways.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Pilcher stated:
Article 32 of the Convention, provides in terms that any clause in the con-
tract of carriage which purports to infringe the rules laid down by the
Convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied or by altering the
rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void. This Article appears to rein-
force the view that Article 28 (1) of the Convention which deals with
jurisdiction was intended to be applied strictly, and I accordingly conclude
that the effect of Article 28 (1) is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts of
this country to entertain a claim by the plaintiffs against the second de-
fendants (Aden Airways)."'
The Court's position is, of course, based on the absence of Convention
9 Berner v. United Airlines, 2 Misc.2d 260; 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 3 App. Div.
2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956).
8I Lloyds List L.R. 154 (Q.B. 1953),
2' Ibid,
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Article 28 (1) jurisdictional contacts as to Aden Airways inasmuch as its
principle place of business and ordinary residence were Aden and the
place of destination was Djibouti. While the remaining contact, namely
the place where the contract was made, was not specifically mentioned, it
is clearly implied that the BOAC office in London, where the contract
was made, could not be treated as an "establishment" of Aden Airways.
The Court's position in completely ignoring the possibility of an agency
relationship between BOAC and Aden Airways at London has not escaped
criticism by legal scholars in the field. 2 It would appear proper for pur-
poses of classification to place this case under possibilty number one of the
four possible approaches previously considered.
Treatment of this same question in the courts within the United States
cannot be characterized as uniform. In one of the first United States cases
to specifically consider the problems presented by Article 28, the New
York Supreme Court made certain determinations worthy of careful study
in Berner v. United Airlines.3 The plaintiff's intestate purchased a ticket
in New York City for Sydney, Australia and return via San Francisco.
The transportation between New York and San Francisco was by United
Airlines and the transportation between San Francisco and Australia was
by British Commonwealth Airlines. During the return portion of the
trip the British Commonwealth aircraft in which the decedent was flying,
crashed, killing all on board. The purchase of the ticket in New York City
had been through British Overseas Airways Corp. Action was brought in
the New York Supreme Court. Service of process on British Common-
wealth was achieved through service on BOAC executive personnel in
New York.
Jurisdiction was challenged by the defendant, British Commonwealth,
alleging that it was a foreign corporation not doing business within the
state of New York. The court had no difficulty in establishing that the
Warsaw Convention applied to the transportation and then proceeded to
the questions of Article 28 (1) as to its jurisdiction under the Convention.
The Court established that there were two clear jurisdictional contacts:
1. New York City was the "place of business through which the con-
tract had been made."
2. New York City is "the place of destination."
However, making the British Commonwealth Airlines fit into these
contacts presented somewhat of a problem. The fact that it was an
Australian carrier with no place of business of its own in New York, and
no flight operation of any kind into or out of New York State, were
clearly obstacles in the path toward jurisdiction. The Court found the
jurisdictional element by holding that since the Warsaw Convention was
a part of the contract of carriage, it constituted an acceptance by the
foreign carrier of jurisdiction over it in any of the forums where under
the provisions of Article 28 of the Convention, the passenger or his
executors might elect to sue. The contract of carriage entered into in New
York by BOAC was held binding on British Commonwealth Airlines since
BOAC had entered into the agreement on its behalf as British Common-
wealth's general agent in New York. Then to settle the matter, the court
32 Guerreri, American Jurisprudence on the Warsaw Convention (1960) at p. 40.
332 Misc.2d 260; 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 3 App. Div.2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884
(1956).
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held that because of the consent to jurisdiction, service of process, the
only remaining requirement under New York Civil procedure, was
waived.
On review, the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's ruling. The appellate court did, however, go
to greater lengths to establish that service of process through BOAC as
general agent was good service on British Commonwealth Airlines. The
Rotterdamsche Bank case had two basic distinguishing characteristics
which helped to solve what might otherwise be a conflict in the holdings
of the New York courts and the English courts. They are:
1. That the agency relationship between BOAC and Aden Airways was
not specifically considered by the English courts in Rotterdamsche Bank
and,
2. That in Rotterdamsche Bank, Aden Airways was not specifically
named in the contract of carriage made with BOAC in London.
However, Aden Airways, a wholly owned subsidiary of BOAC, was
clearly shown in the BOAC system timetable as being the carrier operating
between Cairo and Djibouti.
While the New York State courts are in no way bound by the findings
of the British courts and the silence on the part of the British courts as
to any agency relationship between the carriers keeps their holding from
being directly on point or, for that matter, in conflict, the implications
raised by the silence of the British courts in the Rotterdamsche Bank case
and by the United States courts in the Berner case speak out eloquently
that in the interest of uniformity of interpretation of the Convention
some comment by the court in these precedent cases might have been
desirable. The fact that both the basic opinion presented by Judge
Markowitz and the appellate opinion of Judge Bergan do not even men-
tion, cite, or refer to the Rotterdamsche case of some three years earlier
leaves one with some speculation.
The proper answer to the question of how far the agency relationship
should go under this contact three of Article 28, is debatable. The idea of
requiring a carrier to defend a case anywhere in the world because a ticket
has been sold on its behalf by a travel agent or an originating carrier
while at the same time the courts of the carrier's domicile or principle
place of business (if not in a high contracting party) do not have juris-
diction under the Convention, and further, that under no circumstances
(in the absence of an Article 28 contact) does the place of the accident
have jurisdiction, results in what is perhaps an extreme situation. In fact,
this position could quite easily result in granting jurisdiction to a forum
where advanced judicial practices and procedures, rules of evidence, and
the like, are not used. It was this type of situation which the framers of
the Warsaw Convention hoped to avoid when they excluded the place
where the accident occurs from jurisdictions available under Article 28."
On the other hand, it might be argued that the place where the con-
tract of carriage was entered into should certainly be an acceptable forum
in all cases in that the carrier knowingly and voluntarily had allowed and
probably desired, an agent (either a travel agent or another carrier) to
enter into the contract of carriage on its behalf.
In conclusion, it must be observed that in actual application, as the
Goedhuis, op. ot, s uro note 16, at 287.
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foregoing cases so well illustrate, particular factual settings permeate
the purely legal questions presented to such an extent that no definite
conclusions as to the position of the courts on this point of law can be
predicted at this time.
4. Contact Four--fBefore the Court at the Place of Destination"
Since it was the desire of the framers of the Convention to limit juris-
diction in any action under the Convention to the courts of a High Con-
tracting Party, it follows that the only certain jurisdiction is at the place
of destination. This is so since it is not necessary that the carrier be a
national of a High Contracting Party in order for the Convention to
apply.a  Therefore, it is not only conceivable but quite possible for a
situation to arise where all three of the jurisdictional contacts under Article
28 involving the carrier would be forums in other than High Contracting
Parties. In such a case all forums would be denied jurisdiction by the
terms of Article 28. For example: The passenger purchases a ticket in
country A for carriage on carrier X from a point in country B to a point
in country X and return to country B. If country A and country X are
both non-Warsaw Convention countries and carrier X is a national of
country X, which is also its principal place of business, none of the carrier
contacts (one through three) for jurisdiction would be in a High Con-
tracting Party. Therefore, all contacts except "place of destination" would
not be available under Article 28 which limits the action to the courts of
High Contracting Parties.
In every situation coming under the Convention rules the place of
destination provides an available forum since any carriage which does
not have its agreed destination within a Warsaw Convention country
will never be subject to Convention applicability.
The obvious and perhaps most difficult question presented by this con-
tact is to determine exactly what is the place of destination. The courts
considering this point have thus far treated the place of destination as
establishing jurisdiction under Article 28 in an identical manner with the
place of destination for applicability of the Convention under Article 1.
For purposes of uniformity and consistency, both recognized as virtues
under any form of jurisprudence, such treatment is above reproach or
criticism. It follows, that this contact is controlled absolutely by the
destination as shown on the contract of carriage. A round trip ticket for
example, would have as its ultimate destination the same point as the
place or origin. Also, an alternative destination for operational reasons
would not give the court jurisdiction at the alternate destination any
more than the place of air crash which thereby becomes in a physical
sense the place of final termination of the flight, is considered by the
courts as the point of destination for Convention purposes. 6 Likewise,
transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers whether
covered by a single contract or a series of contracts would have as its
ultimate destination the last and final point in the air carriage so long
as the parties regarded the movement as a single operation."a
However, the import of Article 28 for jurisdictional purposes as con-
aGlenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
S Goedhuis, op. cit. supra note 16, at 288; Slack, International Unification of Private Law
Rules on Air Transportation and the Warsaw Convention, 4 Air L. Rev. 345 (1933).
' Warsaw Convention, Article 1 (3).
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trasted with Article 1 for defining the applicability of the Convention
does have one vital point of distinction. In order for the Convention to
apply under Article 1 it is only necessary that the place of destination be
within the territory of a High Contracting Party, the particular place
within that High Contracting Party not being in question. But when
Article 28 is considered as to High Contracting Parties having distinct
internal sub-divisions for jurisdiction such as in the United States, it
becomes necessary to consider whether federal or state courts have juris-
diction, or both, and if state courts, which state or states? This matter
will be treated in more detail in the following section."8
A somewhat unique application of this fourth and final jurisdictional
contact is illustrated by the case of Northwest Airlines v. Gorter Admx."
In that case decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, the
deceased, Waldrep, was a Northwest Airlines passenger enroute from Japan
to McChord Air Force Base in the state of Washington. The aircraft
crashed in the waters off the coast of British Columbia, killing Waldrep.
Northwest Airlines is a Minnesota corporation qualified to do business in
the state of Washington. The deceased was a resident of the state of
Alabama, leaving as his sole heir a minor daughter residing in the state of
New Mexico. The only asset in Waldrep's estate was the right of action
for wrongful death against the carrier Northwest. The administratrix
received letters of administration from the trial court as the personal
representative and was appointed as such. In the lower court, Northwest
moved to dismiss on the ground that the Washington state courts had
no jurisdiction over the asset, i.e., the wrongful death action.
From a judgment dismissing the petition, Northwest appealed. The
Supreme Court for the state of Washington in affirming the decision of the
trial court, pointed out that the destination of the plane in which the
deceased was killed was McChord Field in the state of Washington.
Citing Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, the Court stated that inas-
much as the destination was in the state of Washington, the courts of
that state being the "courts at the place of destination" would have
jurisdiction of the action. '
C. Actions Outside The Four Jurisdictional Contacts
Writers as well as the courts are in agreement that the plaintiff is
limited in his choice of courts to those of the High Contracting Parties
identified by the specific jurisdictional contacts of Article 28. However,
as to the courts not defined by these contacts, two basic situations are
presented, i.e., (1) other Warsaw Convention countries, and (2) non-
Warsaw Convention countries.
1. Other Warsaw Convention Countries
If a case controlled by the Warsaw Convention were presented to a
Warsaw Convention forum not falling within the contacts of Article 28,
38 Dunning v. Pan American World Airways, Jan. 7, 1954 (D.C.D.C.); Scarf v. Trans World
Airlines, Sept. 2, 1955 (S.D.N.Y.); Winsor, Admr. v. United Airlines, 153 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y.
1957); Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., Nov. 15, 1956 (E.D.N.Y.); Spencer v. North-
west Orient Airlines, 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Green v. El-Al Israel Airlines,
May 24, 1960 (E.D.N.Y.).
3949 Wash. 2d 711, 306 P.2d 213 (1957).
' For further consideration of destination as a jurisdictional contact, see Roming, Zustandigkeit
und Vollstreckbarkeit im internationalen und Schweizerischen Luftprivatrecht (1958).
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it appears that such court would refuse to consider the action because
of a lack of jurisdiction. The effect of Article 28 limiting the jurisdic-
tion to four specific jurisdictional contacts, all of them within the terri-
tories of High Contracting Parties, has been generally regarded as ex-
clusive."' The language of the official British text and the United States
Department of State translation are uniform: "An action for damages
must be brought, etc. . . ." (italics supplied)
This is based upon the official French: "L'action en responsabilit6 devra
etre port~e etc. . . ." (italics supplied)
The word "devra" is the third person singular, future tense, of the
irregular verb "devoir." "Etre" is the infinite "to be." "Port~e," from the
verb "porter" meaning "to bring within the range of reach." In this
instance, the past participle form is used and is translated "brought." The
verb "devoir" has various meanings, e.g., "to owe, to have to, to be
obliged to, should, must, ought." However, when followed by the in-
finite "6tre" it usually indiates an obligation. The strength or force of
the obligation may vary from a mild or almost suggestive one (ought or
should) to a strong obligation (must or have to). Used in the future
tense, there is little doubt that the limiting of the jurisdictions is intended
to be exclusive and not optional. Any doubt as to the strength of the
original language is dispelled by two factors within the Convention itself."
First, the use of the proper form of the verb "devoir" is provided to
mean "must" or "shall" in other articles of the Convention, e.g., in
Articles 3 (1), 4 (3) and 8, "doit contenir" is translated "shall contain."
In Article 13, "doit aviser" is translated to mean "it shall be the duty (of
the carrier) to give notice,"-United States version, "it is the duty (of
the carrier) to give notice"--English text, Article 26, "doit adresser au
transporteur une protestation," translated "must complain to the carrier."
Article 26(3) "doit 6tre faite" translated "must be made." While there
are also a number of instances both in the British text and in the United
States translation where the words "must" and "shall" have been used
without the verb "devoir" appearing in the corresponding French text,
this does not weaken or lessen the use of the word together with its mean-
ing and purposes in Article 28 (1).
Second, when Article 28 (1) is considered in the light of Article 32,
the mandatory effect of the former is further strengthened. Article 32
provides:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements entered into
before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the
rules laid down by this Convention, whether by deciding the law to be
applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
Nevertheless, for the transportation of goods, arbitration clauses shall be
allowed, subject to Convention, if the arbitration is to take place within one
of the jurisdictions referred to in the first paragraph of Article 28.
It is readily apparent that any alteration of the rules as to jurisdiction
41 Supra note 4.
42 Although the translation of the passages in question are based upon the official United States
State Department translation, 49 Stat. 3020, the following French dictionaries were consulted by
the author: Passy, New International French-English Dictionary (1945); J~ravte, Vocabulaire
Francais-Anglais de Termes et Locutions Juridiques (1953); Dalrymple, French-English Dictionary
of Legal Words and Phrases (2d ed. 1948).
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under Article 28 even by mutual consent is strictly prohibited and any
such agreement is null and void.
However, in spite of this apparently mandatory nature, certain ques-
tions have been raised by court rulings. In Berner v. United Airlines, Inc.
the court seems to imply that the four contacts named are merely those
forums in which "the carrier has consented to be sued . . . and that the
passenger may rely on this consent in booking passage.""
In other words, it does not limit the plaintiff but merely guarantees
four places where the action can be brought without incurring objection
by the carrier on jurisdictional grounds. Does it then follow that, as-
suming some other basis for jurisdiction over the defendant carrier, the
plaintiff may bring an action in a court outside these identified by the
four jurisdictional contacts of Article 28? To give the Warsaw Convention
full force and effect, this question must be answered in the negative.
From the foregoing language of the Convention, it would appear safe
to conclude that if the question of lack of jurisdiction under Article 28
is properly raised by the defendant, and the forum in question is within
a Warsaw Convention country, then the Court will or should dismiss the
action for lack of jurisdiction." As a practical matter, the only situations
where such a forum would be selected by the plaintiff would be that it
was at the lex loci delicti" or that it was the forum of the plaintiff's place
of residence or domicile. In almost all cases of this type the selection of
a forum other than one provided in Article 28 would be based on one or
two primary considerations or both. First, ease of litigation. Since the
plaintiff would usually consult, at least initially, a local attorney, if at
all possible, the local forum which is more familiar to the attorney and
client would be preferred. Also, as a general rule the cost of suit in the
local forum would be less to the plaintiff since the necessity for journeying
to another country would not be present.
Second, the application of the law of the lex loci delicti. The vast ma-
jority of cases have held that the Warsaw Convention does not create a
cause of action by its own terms.4 Following this majority opinion to its
logical conclusion, a cause of action must therefore be based upon such
action for damages as is provided by the lex loci delicti or be based upon
an action for breach of contract governed generally by the law of the
place where the contract was made.
The latter of these two possibilities, i.e., an action based on breach of
contract, although vigorously supported by several writers in the field,
has not received any substantial recognition by the courts to date.4 '
A priori, if the action were instituted at the place where the accident oc-
curred, the problem of proving foreign law would be eliminated.
It is interesting to note that the original draft of the Convention in-
432 Misc.2d 260; 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 3 App. Div.2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d
884 (1956).
4Venue as distinguished from jurisdiction will be considered in this study, infra.
" Excluded from Article 28 after much deliberation at the Second International Conference
for Private Air Law (Warsaw 1929). See Goedhuis, op. cit. supra note 16, at 287.
4' Finne v. K.L.M., March 15, 1951 (S.D.N.Y.); Noel v. L.A.V., 247 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1957);
Komlos v. Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2nd Cir. 1953), cert. denied 348 U.S. 820 (1954); Spencer
v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hennesy v. Air France (Fr.)
April 4, 1952, Tribunal civil de la Seine.
47 E.g., Clancy, Fatalities in Aircraft Crashes-A Contractual Basis of Recovery? 27 J. Air L.
& Corn, 262 (1960).
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cluded as the court having jurisdiction the one at the place of the accident
as a fifth available forum under Article 28. However, at the Warsaw
conference, the representatives of the United Kingdom objected to the
inclusion of this jurisdictional contact on the ground that on long dis-
tance international flights an accident could occur at a place having a
poorly organized or underdeveloped judicial system, or none at all, e.g.,
the high seas. Supported by the French delegation, the British proposal was
accepted by the Conference and jurisdiction at the place of the accident
was deleted from Article 28.
The weaknesses in the argument advanced above are: First, even with
the inclusion of the court having jurisdiction at the place where the acci-
dent occurred, the over-all limitation on jurisdiction would have little
effect since with the possible exception of certain British and French
colonies and protectorates, the High Contracting Parties are for the most
part countries with satisfactory judicial systems. Second, the same argu-
ment might equally apply to the place of destination or to the carrier's
"place of business" through which the contract of carriage was made.
Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot be expected to select such a remote
forum because of the difficulty which is likely to result in enforcing any
judgments obtained there in other jurisdictions. However, the value of
the foregoing observation is probably moot as a practical matter since
there has been no trend toward enlarging the jurisdictional contacts under
Article 28.4"
2. Non-Warsaw Convention Countries
The jurisdictional problem presented by the filing of a case controlled
'by the Warsaw Convention in a non-Warsaw Convention forum is some-
what different. This difference is due to the fact that the non-Warsaw
forum is not bound by an international agreement to recognize the War-
saw Convention, its applicability, operation, or terms and conditions.
Therefore, several alternatives are available to the non-Warsaw court if an
action is brought there: First, the court could accept jurisdiction and
proceed with the case, ignoring the Warsaw Convention to which its gov-
ernment is not a party. Second, the court may accept jurisdiction and pro-
ceed with the case, but recognize the terms and conditions of the Con-
vention as being applicable under the conflicts law of the forum (except
Article 28, of course, which would deprive the forum of jurisdiction) as
to the substance of the action. Third, the court could refuse jurisdiction
on the grounds that all terms and conditions of the Warsaw Convention
are applicable including Article 28 which thereby ousts the judicial juris-
diction from that forum as not being in the territory of a High Con-
tracting Party.
Each of the three courses of action assumes that the forum would
48 Minutes of II Confirence Internationale de Droit Priv6 A6rien (Warsaw, Oct. 4-12, 1929),
at p. 78.
"' No change as to jurisdictional aspects is provided in the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw
Convention. The Protocol is drafted in the English, French and Spanish languages. However, in
cases of doubt, the French text is official. Proper title is: "Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw
on 12 October, 1929." Although opened for signature at The Hague on September 28, 1955, it is
not as yet in force at the time of this writing. The United States sent a delegation to the conference
at The Hague, 33 Dep't. State Bull. 440 (1955), but has not ratified the Protocol to date. See
also, de Villenauve Compdience Jurisdictionnelle et Lex Fori Dans La Convention de Varsovie, 8
McGill L.J. 284 (1962).
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ordinarily have jurisdiction under its own lex fori aside from the
Warsaw Convention question through normal standards of establishing
judicial jurisdiction as have been previously considered herein. Which
path the court will follow depends to a great extent on the specific relation-
ship between the forum and the cause of action. For example, the forum at
the place where the accident occurred has by usual standards of interna-
tional law jurisdiction of the matter and would, in most instances, follow
the first or second procedure enumerated above. Since the lex loci delicti
would apply to the case, the Court could feel free to proceed. How-
ever, if the action is brought before some other court such as at the car-
rier's domicile or principal place of business, the court will probably look
to its own conflict law and decide whether it will grant a motion to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction."
Some writers have taken the position that the non-Warsaw forum
should apply the jurisdictional provisions as part of the contract between
the parties." This would result in the utilization of our third possibility,
i.e., the ousting of jurisdiction from a non-Warsaw forum that would
otherwise have jurisdiction. Such an approach would be perhaps com-
mendable, but it is difficult to visualize this action being taken by courts
unless urged to do so by other difficulties of a practical vein or an unusual
factual situation. Therefore, no definite conclusions can be reached as to
which approach will be taken since it is entirely discretionary with the
court. There are several cases, however, that reflect what might happen.
In an early Warsaw Convention case, F. A. v. Hungarian Airlines," the
plaintiff had filed an action against the carrier for the loss of a coat which
had fallen through an open window over Prague, Czechoslovakia, during
a flight from Budapest to London. Hungary was not a party to the War-
saw Convention at the time. The court admitted its jurisdiction in accord-
ance with the Hungarian rules of civil procedure, but proceeded to apply
the Convention as the law applicable in Czechoslovakia, the loci delicti,
which was party to the Convention.
Another case,53 while not specifically compatible since the destination
was in a non-Warsaw country (Turkey), is nonetheless a worthwhile
example of judicial thinking on this point. Goods were being transported
from Geneva to Rome by Alitalia and from Rome to Istanbul by L.A.I.
Although L.A.I. had a ticket office (quichet) in Zfirich, the court held
that such an office was not an establishment within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention and further that there were no contacts whatsoever
with Geneva, and thereby rendered that forum without jurisdiction." As
stated above, this is not specifically on point since the requirements under
Article 1 to subject the carriage to the Warsaw Convention are lacking.
However, plaintiff then brought action in the courts of Ziirich on the
basis of Article 12 of the Swiss Air Transport Regulations of 1952 which
provides:
5o Roming, op. cit. supra note 40, at 61.
"' Riese-Lacour, Pricis de Droit Airien (1951).
" (Hungary) April 2, 1936, Royal Court of Appeals of Budapest.
53 M.D. v. L.A.I (Swiss), March 26, 1957, Court of First Instance of Geneva.
"Based upon Article 12(1) of the Swiss Air Transport Regulations of 1952 which provides
that the proper forum shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention.
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1) Le for de l'action en dommages et intrets, se d~termine selon les dis-
positions de la Convention de Varsovie.
2) Si un transporteur 6tranger a d~sign6 l'Office F~deral de l'Air, un
domicile juridique en Suisse, il pent, en outre, etre actionn6 devant le juge
de ce domicile.
Translation:
1) The forum for actions in damages and interest shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
2) If a foreign carrier designates to the Federal Aviation Office, a domicile
within Swiss jurisdiction, it may, in addition, be subject to an action by
the court of that domicile.5
The court accepted the argument that under paragraph 2, the defendant
had by choice accepted a domicile in Zurich thereby giving the ZUrich
court jurisdiction according to Swiss law."
IV. PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL SUB-DIVISIONS AND VENUE
Until this point, we have limited our consideration of jurisdiction to
the national level since breakdowns into political sub-divisions below that
level do not affect international aspects of a treaty. In the United States,
we are faced with a different situation. With the additional factor of
jurisdiction on the state level and the venue question as between federal
district courts, the provisions of Article 28 (2) take on added significance.
If venue on the Federal District Court level or jurisdiction on the state
level are properly "questions of procedure to be governed by the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, 'W a superstructure of local law
becomes firmly implanted on the foundation of jurisdiction under the
Convention.
A. State Courts
In the state courts the question of national as distinguished from state
jurisdiction in relation to Article 28 has not been raised in any case of
record in the United States.5" In every instance, the state court has taken
the position that if one of the four contacts is present within the state,
the state courts then have jurisdiction. Likewise if none of the four con-
tacts are within the state, then the state courts lack jurisdiction without
regard to whether any of the contacts are present in any other part of
the United States or not.
On the other hand, the Superior Court of Delaware has denied juris-
diction on the grounds of forum non conveniens in a case where contact
one, i.e., domicile of the carrier, was clearly in the State of Delaware.
No state court ruling involving Article 28 has made direct reference
to problems of jurisdiction or venue within the particular state court
S5 Approximate translation by author.
56 M.D. vs. L.A.I. (Swiss), Jan. 15, 1958, Obergericht des Kantons Ziirich. Reported in Verplaetse,
International Law in Vertical Space (1960) at 313.
" Warsaw Convention, Article 28(2).
"' State court cases where the question of jurisdiction have been raised are: Berner v. United
Airlines, 2 Misc.2d 260; 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 3 App. Div.2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884
(1956). Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian International Airline, 29 Misc.2d 449, 211 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
" Winsor, Admr. v. United Airlines, Inc., Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County,
Sept. 12, 1958, 5 Av. Cas. 18,170.
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system. This writer assumes that should such a question be raised, it is
one of procedure to be governed by the law of the forum under Article
28(2).
B. Federal Courts
It is in the area of subject matter jurisdiction and venue that the
federal courts have had their greatest difficulties.
The first test of Article 28, in this regard, came in the case of Dunning
v. Pan American World Airways"° wherein the plaintiffs' intestates, Dun-
ning and Mott, were killed aboard a Pan American aircraft which crashed
in Liberia enroute from Johannesburg to Lisbon. Dunning's ticket was
issued by Pan American in Paris, Mott's ticket was issued in Lisbon.
Action was brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia against the carrier by the two administratrices. Thereafter,
the defendant moved for a dismissal of both actions, or for a change of
venue, upon the ground that both actions were subject to the provisions
of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention, "and the District of
Columbia is not one of the jurisdictions in which plaintiff's claim may be
brought." The carrier had no scheduled flights into or out of the District
of Columbia or the Washington National Airport. It was a New York
corporation with its principal executive and administrative offices in New
York City.
Plaintiffs argued that the term "domicile" and "principal place of
business" as used in Article 28 of the Convention, must be construed "in
the international sense to mean the nation of domicile or principal place
of business." Since the carrier's domicile and principal place of business
were concededly within the United States and service of process in the
District of Columbia had not been contested, the actions were properly
before the District of Columbia Court. The Court without written opinion
issued an order changing venue and transferring the case to the Southern
District of New York. Certain conclusions can be reached, however,
from the court's ruling. Pan American used Washington as an alternate
airport for flights diverted from their scheduled destination because of
weather or other emergency conditions. Its employees stationed at the
Washington airport were engaged in servicing such diverted flights, and
cargo shipments originating in Washington which were to be carried on
other flights out of other airports, to which the shipments were forwarded
by other means of transportation. Pan American had other employees
stationed in Washington concerned with the sale of transportation on de-
fendant's flights originating in other cities. There can be no question but
that Pan American was doing business in the District of Columbia. It
did not contest the service of process in the District and under normal
circumstances in the absence of hardship or inconvenience which were
not alleged would not be entitled to a change in venue. It follows that the
district court must have recognized the provisions of Article 28 (1) as
superceding local law even as to venue in spite of the flexibility offered
by Article 28 (2).
This position is hard to reconcile with a later ruling of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Mason v.
60 Jan. 7, 1954 (D.C.D.C.), 4 Av. Cas. 17,394.
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B.O.A.C.6 Mason, a United States citizen, purchased a ticket from a travel
agent in Brattleboro, Vermont, for a round trip from Boston to Barbados,
British West Indies. The portion of the transportation as agreed upon
between San Juan, Puerto Rico and Barbados was by British West Indian
Airlines, Ltd. The plaintiff brought an action for injuries alleged to have
occurred while a BWIA passenger between San Juan and Barbados.
BWIA, Ltd., a corporation organized under the laws of Trinidad and
Tobago, B.W.I., moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that under Article 28 of the Convention, the action could be
brought in the courts of only one of three possible places: (1) Trinidad,
B.W.I., which is the place of the defendant's domicile and principal
place of business, (2) Vermont, the defendant's place of business (through
a travel agent) where the contract with the plaintiff was made, or (3)
Massachusetts, the place of destination. The court bluntly stated its dis-
agreement and submitted:
This court's jurisdiction, that is its power to hear and adjudicate the con-
troversy between these parties, is found either in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (a)
(2), or if it be contended that the action is one arising under a treaty of
the United States in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331. Article 28 of the Convention seems
to me clearly to relate only to venue which is merely a limitation designed
for the convenience of litigants and which is not challenged by this motion.
The Convention does not purport to take away from the courts of any
adhering nation the "power to adjudicate" which the latter has granted
them, or to grant such power to any court not otherwise possessed of it.
By its terms, Article 28 merely limits, for the convenience of litigants
(particularly, it would seem, the airline companies), the "places" where
actions for damages may be brought.
This case apparently stands for the proposition that Article 28 of the
Convention applies on the national level only, and that jurisdiction of the
courts internally is determined by local law.
A more recent case involved the crash of a United Airlines aircraft in
Colorado on November 1, 1955, .n which all lives were lost as the result
of an explosion of a bomb placed in the luggage of one of the passengers. "
The plaintiff, a resident of Newfoundland, individually and as admin-
istrator of his deceased wife, sued to recover damages for her death.
Plaintiff's intestate, also a resident of Newfoundland, had purchased air
transportation from Gander to Seattle, Washington, and return. The
ticket was issued by Trans World Airlines, Inc., at Gander for the round
trip with intermediate stops at New York both ways. The travel was
therefore subject to the Warsaw Convention.
The action was brought before the United States District Court, Eastern
District of New York, whereupon the defendant carrier filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. The Court stated:
The question of jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
is not free from doubt, the narrow issue being whether the defendant main-
tains "a principal place of business" in New York City, since it is clear
that the decedent did not there enter into contractual relations with this
defendant.
41 Nov. 15, 1956 (S.D.N.Y.), 5 Av. Cas. 17,121.
62 Winsor, Admr. v. United Airlines, 153 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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The plaintiff relies upon Berner v. United Air Lines, Inc. In that case
the ticket was purchased in the New York office of the airline sought to be
held responsible for an airplane crash. The decision was that British Com-
monwealth Pacific Air Lines sold the ticket in question through British
Overseas which maintained an office in New York, namely, it was doing
business there through the activities of British Overseas.
The case is parallel to this only with reference to the nature of the busi-
ness being conducted by this defendant in the City of New York in view
of the assertion made in the affidavits submitted on behalf of this motion.
From that of its said Vice-President Petty, it appears that this defendant is
a Delaware corporation and that its principal executive offices are located in
Chicago, Illinois, and its main Operating Base is located in Denver, Colorado.
There is a paucity of factual showing concerning the nature of the business
done in the New York office of the defendant, but sufficient evidence has been
shown to support the inference hereby drawn, that the New York office is
the place where much of the booking, for air flights over the defendant's
line is done; and it is thought that not too fine a distinction should be
drawn, at least for the purposes of this motion, between the New York office
and the Chicago office.
Thus, the motion to dismiss will be denied, for the reason that apparent
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention has been shown.3
The court thereupon granted the alternative motion to transfer the
action to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
From the foregoing, no definite conclusions can be reached as to whether
the court was following the Dunning case, the Mason case, or somewhere
in between. Neither of these two precedent cases was cited in the Winsor
case. Under the Mason theory, the court's ruling that Warsaw Conven-
tion jurisdiction was proper in New York is consistent since the action
could be brought in any United States court so long as federal rules were
fulfilled. However, the court went to great length to find the "principal
place of business" in New York (in spite of evidence that the principal
place of business was Chicago) apparently to fulfill Article 28 require-
ments and justify federal court jurisdiction in the Eastern District of
New York. If the court intended to hold that Article 28 applied on the
national level only, then it would not have been necessary to establish
the principal place of business in New York since it would simply be
a matter of venue subject to the rules of the forum. It might appear that
the Winsor case was therefore in accord with the Dunning case, but even
this is doubtful in view of the ultimate ruling of the court.
In Berner v. United Air Lines, the only case referred to by the court,
New York was also the destination of the contract of carriage and juris-
diction was achieved under Article 28 on that basis. Also, in the Berner
case, the ticket was issued in New York. Neither of these conditions was
present in the Winsor case. If the Dunning theory were followed in the
Winsor case, the only courts with jurisdiction under Article 28 would
probably be at Gander, Newfoundland, as the place of destination and
the place where ticket was issued; or in Delaware, legal domicile of the
carrier; or, at Chicago, Illinois, the carrier's principal place of business.
It can only be concluded, therefore, that in spite of lip service to the
6 3d. at 247.
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jurisdictional question, the court was actually leaning toward the position
that below the national level the question becomes one of local law.
The second part of the court's ruling in transferring the cause to the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado can be sup-
ported on the basis of the second part of Article 28 which allows questions
of procedure to be governed by local law."
C. Recent Cases
1962 federal decisions offer no hope that the uncertainty in regard to
Article 28 will soon be eliminated." In Spencer v. Northwest Orient Air-
lines,"6 the court not only praises and supports the decision in the Mason
case, but goes on to interpret that case as holding: "that Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention did not affect the jurisdiction of the United States
District Courts over a diversity action by an American citizen against
an American air carrier. '
Both the Mason case and the Spencer case contained at least one of
the four jurisdictional contacts within the United States on the national
level so that neither case required a ruling as to the effect of Article 28
on a federal court where all four of the jurisdictional contacts are missing.
As a practical matter, whenever a domestic corporation is the defendant,
contact number one, i.e., court of the domicile of the carrier, will always
give judicial jurisdiction to the United States, at least on the national level.
As to what the federal courts will do when confronted with a Warsaw
Convention case involving a United States citizen as plaintiff in an acci-
dent occuring within the United States where all four jurisdictional con-
tacts are missing, one can only speculate."
In the other recent case, Nudo v. Sabena Air Lines,'" the court was not
confronted with a domestic carrier as a defendant nor with an accident
occuring within the United States. Although not specifically stated, it
would appear that the plaintiffs were United States citizens. The aircraft
accident took place in Belgium; the ultimate destination was Munich; the
contract of carriage was made in Munich; and the domicile and principal
place of business of the carrier is Belgium. In moving to dismiss the action,
the defendant carrier argued that the court lacked jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 28. The plaintiff replied that Sabena, the defendant carrier, maintains
its own sales office in Philadelphia, thereby constituting "a principal place
"It should be noted that the effect of the transfer to Colorado is that the action reaches a
court prohibited from jurisdiction under Article 28(1) of the Convention, i.e., the lex loci delicti.
However, the result can be justified on the basis of venue rather than jurisdiction under Article
28(2) which leaves matters of procedure (including venue) to the lex fori.
65One state court decision, in 1962, involved Article 28, Gordon v. Sabena Air Lines, N.Y.
Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., April 25, 1962, wherein none of the four contacts were within the United
States and the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdcition under Warsaw Convention rules.
66 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The plaintiff was injured in an aircraft crash in the
Philippine Islands. The defendant is a Minnesota corporation; the plaintiff is a resident of the
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong and a citizen of the United States. Defendant has its
principal office and place of business in St. Paul, Minnesota with substantial operations in New
York. Ticket purchased from Cathay Pacific Airways at Kowloon, Hong Kong, for transportation:
Hong Kong-Osaka-Tokyo-Seoul-Tokyo-Okinawa-Manilla-Hong Kong.
67 201 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
" E.g., if a foreign air carrier carrying a United States citizen should crash within the United
States wherein the passenger's origin and destination are in Warsaw Convention countries other
than the United States and the ticket was purchased at a point outside the United States.69 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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of business" under Article 28, and cited the Winsor case for authority.
Senior District Judge Grim, by way of reply, stated in his order:
Under this (Article 28) language, there can be only one principal place of
business, and the defendant's unrefuted affidavits show that defendant's
principal place of business is not in this District, or even in the United
States."°
Since none of the four contacts under Article 28 were present, the court
thereupon disposed of the action by ruling: "I find, therefore, that none
of the conditions of Article 28 is met and that this court has no jurisdic-
tion of the action."7' In this case, the court was not required to make
a determination as to the Warsaw Convention's effect upon venue, there
being no jurisdictional contact under Article 28 present in any part of
the United States. However, the significance of this decision lies in the
acceptance, by a federal court, of the absolute applicability of Article 28
as to judicial jurisdiction in a direct and succinct fashion without apology,
criticism or forced interpretation.
D. Need For Uniform Interpretation
Uniform interpretation of Article 28 by the federal courts is imperative.
Actually, it is not the ultimate ruling in any of the federal cases which
creates an impression of doubt and uncertainty, but rather the obiter dic-
tum which some jurists have felt compelled to include in handing down
opinions on this subject.
This superfluous material reveals two areas of difficulty regarding basic
concepts. First, as to the difference between subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal court system within the United States and national juris-
diction in the absolute sense used in the Warsaw Convention. The subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts as provided in the United States
Constitution7 and by statute" are basically internal in nature and are not
directly involved in Article 28. Subject matter jurisdiction is neither given
nor taken away by the Convention which has been held not to be self-
executing.
In order to afford full effect to local law as the Convention intended,
Article 28 must be administered only on the national level as well as in
all internal matters following local rules under Article 28(2). At the
same time, the limitations of the Convention must be considered as abso-
lute and mandatory on the national level, in the jurisdictional sense, and
be given their proper status as a treaty obligation of our nation without
equivocation. Second, as to venue among the federal courts it may be said
that Article 28 (1) when limited to the national level, is of no consequence
in regard to venue within the federal judicial system. All questions of
venue would follow local law under Article 28 (2) which in this case
would be federal statutes and federal rules of civil procedure. Following
such reasoning, it is not necessary for the federal courts to determine the
existence of one or more of the four contacts of Article 28 (1) within
a particular district to establish jurisdiction therein.
The remaining question is what effect upon jurisdiction is present in a
70 id. at 192.
71 Ibid.
71 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
7328 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1333 (1948).
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case lodged in a court of one state when one or more of the Article 28 (1)
jurisdictional contacts are present in another state or territory of the
United States, but none within the state in which the action is pending.
Assuming that other grounds for jurisdiction over the parties or subject
matter are present, would the requirements of Article 28 (1) be fulfilled?
Using the above indicated national level approach, the answer will be yes.
V. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION
Thus far, the question of jurisdiction in cases controlled by the Warsaw
Convention has been considered under the light of a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction or equivalent procedure, but what result can be ex-
pected if no such objection is raised?
The lack of objection could be due to a special agreement between the
parties, a disregarding of the Warsaw Convention, or simply because both
parties were satisfied with the forum in question. 4 As previously set forth,
Article 32 of the Convention prohibits special agreements which, among
other things, alter the rules as to jurisdiction. It would follow that in War-
saw Convention countries not coming under the four jurisdictional con-
tacts of Article 28, the forum should dismiss the action sua sponte for
lack of jurisdiction. 5 In non-Warsaw Convention countries, the court
would have no such obligation.
However, Article 32 is limited by the phrase "entered into before the
damage occurred." (Italics supplied). Does it follow that the parties could
agree to a particular jurisdiction not provided under Article 28, if the
agreement was made after the damage or injury had occurred? Usually,
a lack of judicial jurisdiction cannot be cured by an agreement of the
parties; " however, if the forum agreed upon would normally have juris-
diction by traditional contacts were it not for the restrictions of Article
28, and by agreement neither party invoked the applicability of the War-
saw Convention, it is doubtful that the action would be dismissed by the
court sua sponte. Such a conclusion is not intended to be a acquiescence
but rather a practical solution. In practice the likelihood of the defendant
carrier and the plaintiff agreeing upon a jurisdiction outside the scope of
Article 28 is remote due to the usual advantage to the carrier in limiting
the amount which can be recovered under Warsaw Convention rules. This
advantage will diminish greatly under the provisions of the Hague Protocol
to the Convention when and if the Protocol goes into effect.
An agreement as to jurisdiction as considered above should not be con-
fused with an out-of-court settlement of the claim. Unless accompanied
by fraud or duress, such settlements are welcomed by all forums and
certainly were not intended to be prohibited by the Convention. Perhaps
it is for this reason that the language of Article 32 so carefully excludes
agreements after the damage has occurred.
While no case law is available directly on this point, it is difficult to
visualize a situation where one of the parties could repudiate a voluntary
settlement agreement reached out-of-court solely on the basis that it did
not conform to the rules of the Warsaw Convention. A recent French
" As to the law applicable see: Sands, Choice of Law in Contracts of International Carriage by
Air, a thesis reviewed in 9 McGill L.J. 162 (1963).
" However, see dictum in Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 201 F. Supp. 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
" 14 Am. Jur., Courts § 184 (1938).
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case, Della Roma v. Air France," does bear some relationship to this aspect
of Article 32. The case was an appeal by the French Social Security Fund
from a decision by the Commercial Tribunal of Marseille denying the
appellant the reimbursement of the amount it paid to the heirs of a Mr.
Della Roma, who died in a plane crash in 1951. The passenger had held a
round trip ticket, Marseille (France) -Brazzaville (French territory in
Central Africa)-Marseille, with a stop in Kano, territory under British
jurisdiction, on the outgoing portion of the trip. The Court properly
affirmed the lower court's finding that the transportation was international
in nature and thereby within the rules of the Warsaw Convention. The
Social Security Fund claimed, in any event, that they were entitled to re-
course against the settlement offer of 2,220,000 francs which had been
accepted by the widow, Mrs. Della Roma. The carrier, Air France, made the
payment on the basis of so-called "individual automatic" insurance giving
to the heirs, in case of death, a sum of 2,220,000 francs, provided that they
(the heirs) waive all claims or their right of action against the company,
its employees or its insurers. The Social Security Fund took the position
that recovery would have to be for damages under the Warsaw Convention
rules and as such they were entitled to subrogation for sums already paid.
However, the Court pointed out:
But although Article 32 declares null any clause of the contract of carriage
and all private agreements entered into prior to damages, by which the
parties seek to depart from the rules set out therein, the carrier is not pre-
cluded from offering to the victim (or heirs) after the damage has occurred
a settlement other than the one provided by Article 22.8
Article 32, in addition to its treatment of special agreements, specifically
allows arbitration clauses in contracts for the transportation of goods;
however, such clauses are subject to the Convention and the arbitration
must take place within one of the four jurisdictions provided under the
first paragraph of Article 28. What is left unsaid as to arbitration is prob-
ably more important than that which the Article actually provides. It
appears that an agreement to arbitrate included in a contract of passenger
carriage could not be enforced and in fact would probably be held invalid
under Warsaw rules. The question of agreements to arbitrate made after
the damage or injury occurred has not been answered in case law. Based
on considerations of public policy and the universal desire of jurists to
reduce litigation, it seems likely that post-injury arbitration agreements
would be treated by the courts in the same manner as an out-of-court
settlement. Therefore, in the absence of fraud, duress, or violation of the
terms of the arbitration agreement (such as an award going beyond the
authorized scope of the agreement to arbitrate), it would not be invali-
dated by the courts.
However, whether or not a Warsaw Convention court would actually
enforce an arbitration award in the same manner as a direct out-of-court
settlement is subject to some speculation. Probably there would be no
difficulty in this regard if the board of arbitration and the court asked
to enforce the award are located in a country having judicial jurisdiction
under Article 28 or before a non-Warsaw Convention court. On the other
17 (Fr.) March 13, 1959, Ct. of Appeals, Aix en Provence, 7th Civil Chamber.
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hand, a Warsaw Convention court outside the four jurisdiction contacts
might not be quite so willing.
It is most unfortunate that these questions as to arbitration were not
resolved in the 1955 Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
Accidents involving international air carriers, both United States flag
companies and foreign, have presented new problems in the area of judicial
jurisdiction. Applying domestic standards for the determination of judicial
jurisdiction will not always suffice. Of course, as a point of beginning,
jurisdiction must be based upon local law. However, the principles of
general international law and the specific provisions of applicable treaties
to which the United States is party must also be considered. The acceptable
standards or contacts of general international law are equally applicable to
situations involving international air carriers as they are to other inter-
national situations requiring a determination of jurisdiction.
In most cases involving an international air carrier there is superim-
posed upon the framework of local and general international law, the
specific jurisdictional limitations of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.
It would appear from the records of the deliberations of the delegates at
the Warsaw Conference giving birth to the Convention in 1929, that the
four jurisdictions set forth in Article 28 were intended to be absolute and
not merely suggestive, permissive, or in the nature of venue. The courts
of the United States, particularly the federal area, have been reluctant to
recognize the mandatory effect of this treaty provision. However, in no
case have the federal or state courts failed to recognize the provision on
the national level. The state courts, particularly New York, where many
international cases are originally filed, have on several occasions dismissed
cases for lack of jurisdiction based on Article 28 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. On the other hand, the federal courts have not been faced with
this problem as yet. The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention" con-
tains no revision of Article 28, and it may be assumed that when and if
this amendment goes into effect, it will not alter the material considered
in this study.
79 See sutrra note 49.
